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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Day appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. Following a 
trial, Mr. Day was convicted of burglary and received a unified sentence of fifteen years, 
with five years fixed. On appeal Mr. Day asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to order an additional competency evaluation after defense counsel 
requested that one be preformed due to on-going concerns about Mr. Day's 
competency. 
Mr. Day also asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which 
rises to the level of fundamental error. The unfairness created by the prosecutor's 
misconduct resulted in Mr. Day being denied due process of law and was in violation of 
his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The violations 
occurred when the prosecutor made statements in closing arguments that eluded to 
additional evidence of Mr. Day's guilt that was being excluded and sugge$ting that the 
jury could not consider the absence of evidence noted by defense counsel in 
determining guilt. Although defense counsel did not object to the misconduct, Mr. Day 
asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error, was not 
harmless and, as such, this Court should vacate Mr. Day's conviction. 
Furthermore, Mr. Day asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to an excessive sentence without properly considering the mitigating 
factors in his case. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On August 20, 2010 a Prosecuting Attorney's Information was filed charging 
Mr. Day with robbery and a use of a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.22-23.) 
Mr. Day entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and enhancement. (R., pp.25-26.) At 
the arraignment, the State briefly informed the district court of Mr. Day's history, 
including a prior finding that Mr. Day was incompetent to proceed and his eventual 
decision to represent himself. (Tr., p.10, L.10 - p.11, L.12.) At the arraignment there 
was some discussion about Mr. Day wanting to represent himself; however, it appears 
that counsel remained on the case. (Tr., p.11, L.13-p.14, L.13.) 
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel filed a Motion for Psychological Evaluation 
and Payment requesting that, among other things, Mr. Day's "capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense." (R., pp.27-28.) A 
psychological evaluation was ordered on September 7, 2010. (R., p.30.) 
Dr. John Christensen submitted a report to the district court on September 13, 
201 O stating that Mr. Day had refused to both complete the Personality Assessment 
inventory and to engage in an interview. (Letter from Dr. Christensen.) He concluded 
that as such he could provide no information regarding Mr. Day's mental status, 
psychological function, or competency. (Letter from Dr. Christensen.) 
On October 4, 2010, the district court held a status conference and discussed the 
order for a competency evaluation. (R., pp.37-38.) Mr. Day represented himself at the 
hearing. (Tr., p.25, Ls.14-17.) After some discussion Mr. Day stated that, "I would like 
to just move forward with the blessing of the State hospital if possible." (Tr., p.27, 
Ls.10-12.) The State noted that it was their preference that Mr. Day complete an 
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Following the hearing, the district court entered a Second Order for Psychological 
Evaluation in which the district court ordered that due to Mr. Day's failure to participate 
in the initial evaluation he would be committed to the State Hospital South for 30 days 
and requested that while housed at the hospital an evaluation be completed. 
(R., pp.39-40.) However, two days later, the district court entered an Amended Second 
order for Psychological Evaluation in which the district court ordered that an evaluation 
attempt to be conducted at the county jail and that Mr. Day only be committed to a 
hospital only if the evaluator determined that the evaluation should be conducted at a 
hospital. (R., pp.41-42.) 
On October 8, 2010, Dr. John Landers completed a report regarding the district 
court's order for a competency evaluation. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) 
Or. Landers noted that he reviewed Mr. Day's DHW and jail records, completed a ten 
minute clinical interview, and that Mr. Day had refused to participate in the evaluation 
beyond the brief clinical interview. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) Regardless 
of the lack of current information, Dr. Landers concluded that Mr. Day was fit to 
proceed. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) 
Throughout the pendency of the case, Mr. Day wrote a number of letters to the 
district court and staff. (See generally letters included in the file, but not numbered as 
part of the record.) While some of the letters are brief and somewhat intelligible, others 
are simply incomprehensible. ( See generally letters included in the file, but not 
numbered as part of the record.) Many of the letters mention an incomprehensible 
conspiracy. (See generally letters included in the file, but not numbered as part of the 
record.) 
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At a Status Conference on November 8, 2010, the competency issue was 
discussed again. (R., p.46.) The district court informed Mr. Day that it was interpreting 
some of the letters it had received as an objection to the 18-211 evaluation that had 
been completed. (Tr., p.29, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Day noted that he was objecting. (Tr., p.29, 
L.14.) After some discussion about what had happened with the evaluation, the district 
court asked Mr. Day if he felt he needed to supply additional information for the district 
court to make a determination about competency. (Tr., p.29, L.14 - p.32, L.3.) Mr. Day 
made statements not relevant to the district court's question and, after a lengthy 
discussion, Mr. Day requested that counsel be reappointed on his case. (Tr., p.36, L.5 
- p.37, L.10.) Counsel then informed the district court that he had not discussed the 
report with Mr. Day but that he was "probably willing to abide by the recommendations 
... that [Mr. Day is] competent to stand trial." (Tr., p.39, Ls.5-20.) 
On December 6, 2010, at the pretrial conference, the issue of competency was 
again brought to the district court's attention. (R., pp.47-48.) Defense counsel stated 
that he still had concerns about Mr. Day's competency, that after talking with Mr. Day 
there was concerns that protocol was not followed, and that he believed that Mr: Day 
would now cooperate with an evaluation. (Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.52, L.6.) Defense counsel 
specifically stated that he would like have another evaluation completed. (Tr., p.56, 
Ls.5-8.) Mr. Day informed the court that he did not want to sit for another evaluation, 
talked about how he never hired defense counsel and made other statements that were 
not entirely clear. (Tr., p.52, L.7 - p57, L.12.) The district court then informed Mr. Day 
that he could recommend someone to complete an evaluation. (Tr., p.57, Ls.21-23.) 
Mr. Day then informed the district court that he did not understand what the evaluation 





















that the district court had ordered that he be sent to the state hospital because they 
have a law library, not to determine competency. (Tr., p.57, L.11 - p.60, L.10.) When 
pressed on whether or not he wanted an evaluation Mr. Day stated he did not need one 
and that he just wanted to go to trial. (Tr., p.60, L.17 - p.61, L.6.) The district court 
then moved on to discuss the dates set for trial and did not revisit the competency issue 
further. (Tr., p.61, L.7 - p.64, L. 19.) 
The State filed a Motion in Limine Re: Letter requesting that the district court 
make a ruling in advance of the trial as to the admissibility of a letter purportedly sent 
from Tim Hudson, a person housed with Mr. Day at the county jail, to Megan Miller 
requesting that $200 of the $290 included with the letter be placed on Mr. Day's inmate 
account. (R., pp.59-65.) The issue was discussed at a hearing the day before trial. 
(Tr., p. 75, L.1 - p.114, L.24.) At the hearing, Mr. Day switched from representing 
himself to having counsel reappointed several times. (Tr., p.75, L.1 - p.114, L.24.) 
On January 25, 2011, the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.66-80.) The State's 
first witness was Russell Johnson, the alleged victim. (Tr., p.221, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Johnson 
had been previously declared unavailable and his preliminary hearing testimony was 
read to the jury. (Tr., p.69, Ls.1-11, p.221, L.9.) Mr. Johnson testified that he had been 
robbed at knife point, that he chased the man who robbed him into an apartment 
building, that when police removed Mr. Day from the building he stated that the he was 
not the man that had robbed him, and that the man who robbed him was smaller and 
wearing different clothing. (Tr.8/17/10, p.3, L.6 - p.24, L.25, p.41, L.3 - p.66, L.24.) 
The next witness was Mr. Hooker who saw Mr. Johnson chasing the alleged robber, 
contacted police, and followed the alleged robber in his car, witnessing that individual 
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run into an apartment building; he was unable to identify the person. (Tr., p.228, L.9 -
p.252, L.13.) 
A number of police officers testified about their involvement in response to the 
incident, determining that the only way the building could be exited was the front door or 
through an undisturbed window, locating Mr. Day in the building dressed in different 
clothing, locating clothing that matched the clothing worn by the robber in a different 
part of the building, collecting evidence from the scene and a near by trash can where 
other clothing and a knife were located, talking to several residents of the building, and 
noting that the money was not recovered on that day. (Tr., p.253, L.1 O - p.370, L.25, 
p.396, L.6 - p.418, L.20, p.532, L.1 - p558, L.4.) Officer Boomgaarden testified that 
while Mr. Day was in custody he was housed in the same area as Mr. Hudson who was 
the presumed author of a letter sent out of the jail which included $290, in the same 
denominations as was taken from Mr. Johnson, and directed that $200 be placed on 
Mr. Day's inmate account. (Tr., p.371, L. 18 - p.395, L.14.) 
The State also presented the testimony of several residents of the apartment 
building who testified that they did not see any thing unusual, find any money, or commit 
the robbery themselves. (Tr., p.424, L.6 - p.459, L.17, p.514, L.5 - p.531, L.12.) A 
fingerprint expert from the State Lab testified that he had analyzed the knife and sheath 
and was able to determine that some of the prints did not match Mr. Day's and others 
were not of a sufficient quality to determine if they belonged to Mr. Day or not. 
(Tr., p.489, L.1 - p.513, L.3.) The last witness, Detective Pratt, testified that he 
measured the interior of the shoes worn by Mr. Day and those believed to be worn in 
the robbery and that both sets of shoes were between 10-1/4 inches and 10-11/16 
inches. (Tr., p.565, L.6 - p.570, L.2.) 
6 
The jury returned a guilty verdict for the robbery charge. (R., p.84.) The State 
then dismissed the deadly-weapon enhancement. (Tr., p.632, Ls.11-19.) Following the 
guilty verdict and prior to sentencing, Mr. Day filed several pro se motions which were 
all denied by the district court. (R., pp.87-110.) 
The case proceeded to sentencing. Defense counsel requested that the district 
court retain jurisdiction for up to one year. (Tr., p.638, L.17 - p.639, L.14.) The State 
requested imposition of a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. 
(Tr., p.642, Ls.2-14.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with 
five years fixed. (R., pp.113-115.) Mr. Day filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.117-127.) 
7 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to order an additional 
competency evaluation after defense counsel alerted the district court to its 
continuing concerns about Mr. Day's competency? 
2. Did the State violate Mr. Day's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Day, a unified 






















The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Order An Additional 
Competency Evaluation After Defense Counsel Alerted The District Court To Its 
Continuing Concerns About Mr. Day's Competency 
A Introduction 
Mr. Day asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying an 
additional competency evaluation prior to trial. Mr. Day submits that defense counsel's 
request for an evaluation, the prior failure to participate in competency evaluations, 
Mr. Day's mental health history, and present behavior, was sufficient to require the 
district court to order the evaluation. The district court failed to act within the legal 
bounds of its discretion when it relied not upon all of the factors counseling towards the 
need for an evaluation, but Mr. Day's statement that he just wanted to go to trial. 
Because the district court failed to evaluate Mr. Day's ability to understand the 
proceedings against him and assist in his own defense, it abused its discretion and, 
therefore, the court erred in denying the additional competency evaluation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Order An Additional 
Competency Evaluation After Defense Counsel Alerted The District Court To Its 
Continuing Concerns About Mr. Day's Competency 
Idaho law provides that no person who lacks the capacity to assist counsel or 
understand the proceedings against him or her shall be tried, convicted, sentenced, or 
punished during the period of incompetence. I.C. § 18-210. The standard to be met 
before a mental evaluation of a defendant is required is set forth in Idaho Code § 18-
211: 
Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed 
as set forth in section 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at 
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least one (1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist or shall request 
the director of the department of health and welfare to designate at least 
one (1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and 
report upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with 
defense or understand the proceedings. 
I.C. § 18-211 (emphasis added). 
The decision whether reasonable grounds exist to order a 
psychological/psychiatric evaluation to determine a defendant's competence is left to 
the discretion of the trial court. State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 969 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision not to order a mental 
evaluation will be upheld on appeal. State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 
1999). The appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower 
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). On 
appeal, this Court examines whether there was sufficient, competent, even if conflicting, 
evidence to support the district court's determination of competency. State v. Lovelac&, 
140 Idaho 53, 63 (2003). The applicable legal standard for reviewing a district court's 
decision to deny a psychological evaluation is governed by I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. 
There is a two-pronged test to determine competency. State v. Longoria, 133 
Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 1999). The test to determine whether a criminal defendant is 
competent to stand trial is whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him and whether the defendant has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 





















(1960); Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1999). As such, a defendant must 
not only understand the proceedings against him, but he must also be able to assist in 
his own defense. Longoria, 133 Idaho at 822. 
Shortly after the arraignment, defense counsel filed a Motion for Psychological 
Evaluation and Payment requesting that, among other things, Mr. Day's "capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense." (R., pp.27-
28.) A psychological evaluation was ordered on September 7, 2010. (R., p.30.) 
Dr. John Christensen submitted a report to the district court on September 13, 
2010, stating that Mr. Day had refused to both complete the Personality Assessment 
inventory and to engage in an interview. (Letter from Dr. Christensen.) He concluded 
that as such he could provide no information regarding Mr. Day's mental status, 
psychological function, or competency. (Letter from Dr. Christensen.) 
On October 4, 2010, the district court held a status conference and discussed the 
order for a competency evaluation. (R., pp.37-38.) Mr. Day represented himself at the 
hearing. (Tr., p.25, Ls.14-17.) After some discussion Mr. Day stated that, "I would like 
to just move forward with the blessing of the State hospital if possible.'' (Tr., p.27, 
Ls.10-12.) The State noted that it was their preference that Mr. Day complete an 
evaluation to determine competency. (Tr., p.25, Ls.1-6.) 
Following the hearing, the district court entered a Second Order for Psychological 
Evaluation in which the district court ordered that due to Mr. Day's failure to participate 
in the initial evaluation he would be committed to the State Hospital South for 30 days 
and requested that while housed at the hospital that an evaluation be completed. 
(R., pp.39-40.) However, two days later, the district court entered an Amended Second 
order for Psychological Evaluation in which the district court ordered that an evaluation 
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attempt to be conducted at the county jail and that Mr. Day only be committed to a 
hospital if the evaluator determined that the evaluation should be conducted at a 
hospital. (R., pp.41-42.) 
On October 8, 2010, Dr. John Landers completed a report regarding the district 
court's order for a competency evaluation. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) 
Dr. Landers noted that he reviewed Mr. Day's DHW and jail records, completed a ten 
minute clinical interview, and that Mr. Day had refused to participate in the evaluation 
beyond the brief clinical interview. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) Dr. Landers 
noted that Mr. Day has a history of receiving 18-211 evaluations and placement in State 
Hospital South, most recently from late 2006 through early 2007, and that Mr. Day had 
been released with a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder and malingering 
psychiatric illness in order to avoid prosecution. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) 
The records reviewed did not show a history of treatable mental illness. (Competency 
Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) When Dr. Landers contacted Mr. Day, Mr. Day stated that he 
was unhappy with the way his case was going and then, "began to talk in choppy 
disorganized sentences that were incoherent and illogical ... his verbalizations were 
not fluent and his presentation was effortful." (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) 
Dr. Landers noted that a typical psychotic presentation is fluent, despite being 
incoherent and illogical, and does not take effort. (Competency Evaluation, 
Dr. Landers.) When Mr. Day was done with his statement, he informed Dr. Landers 
that his did not wish to participate in the evaluation. (Competency Evaluation, 
Dr. Landers.) Dr. Landers then informed Mr. Day that he was going to offer an opinion 
on competency regardless of the lack of participation and that his opinion was that 
Mr. Day was fit to proceed and that he was feigning mental illness as had been 
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determined previously. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) Mr. Day then became 
angry and then verbally attacked Dr. Landers in an organized and logical way. 
(Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) Dr. Landers believed that this supported his 
conclusion that Mr. Day was competent. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. Landers.) Dr. 
Landers then concluded that Mr. Day was fit to proceed. (Competency Evaluation, Dr. 
Landers.) 
Throughout the pendency of the case, Mr. Day wrote a number of letters to the 
district court and staff. (See generally letters included in the file, but not numbered as 
part of the record.) While some of the letters are brief and somewhat intelligible, others 
are simply incomprehensible. For example, the following is a brief excerpt from one of 
the numerous letters: 
Yes, I can see my case and it was on sids desk, a bag of medicine 
from Sr. Judge St. Clair, yes Dan, fellow bosses, my case, my feild 
happened to be a pice of cheese. Yes Sid your good worker helped place 
the cheese, Jah Poless, true democracy. Yes prophet sidaway pepol, that 
had their day sclar was a screw. A screw screws? 
(Letter from Mr. Day to Safe Keepers, Oficers (sic], Judges and Officers of the Court 
- attached to a letter dated 9/24H0.) Most of the letters include similar incoherent 
statements that cannot be interpreted. (See generally letters included in the file, but not 
numbered as part of the record.) Many of the letters mention an incomprehensible 
conspiracy. (See generally letters included in the file, but not numbered as part of the 
record.) 
At a Status Conference on November 8, 2010, the competency issue was 
discussed again. (R., p.46.) The district court informed Mr. Day that it was interpreting 
some of the letters it had received as an objection to the 18-211 evaluation that had 
been completed. (Tr., p.29, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Day noted that he was objecting. (Tr., p.29, 
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L.14.) After some discussion about what had happened with the evaluation, the district 
court asked Mr. Day if he felt he needed to supply additional information for the district 
court to make a determination about competency. (Tr., p.29, L.14 - p.32, L.3.) Mr. Day 
made statements not relevant to the district court's question and, after a lengthy 
discussion, Mr. Day requested that counsel be reappointed on his case. (Tr., p.36, L.5 
- p.37, L.10.) Counsel then informed the district court that he had not discussed the 
report with Mr. Day but that he was "probably willing to abide by the recommendations 
... that [Mr. Day is] competent to stand trial." (Tr., p.39, Ls.5-20.) 
On December 6, 2010, at the pretrial conference, the issue of competency was 
again brought to the district court's attention. (R., pp.47-48.) Defense counsel stated 
that he still had concerns about Mr. Day's competency, that after talking with Mr. Day 
there was concerns that protocol was not followed, and that he believed that Mr. Day 
would now cooperate with an evaluation. (Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.52, L.6.) Defense counsel 
specifically stated that he would like have another evaluation completed. (Tr., p.56, 
Ls.5-8.) Mr. Day informed the court that he did not want to sit for another evaluation, 
talked about how he never hired defense counsel and made other statements that were 
not entirely clear. (Tr., p.52, L.7 - p57, L.12.) Mr. Day then continued when asked if he 
wanted a new evaluation: 
Not in the Bonneville County Jail, no. If the Department of Health 
and Welfare and they come as the Department of Health and Welfare, 
sure, because I - you know, like I was saying to him, I don't think that we 
should get away that if the Department of Health and Welfare designate, 
that would mean that the Department of Health and Welfare designate one 
of their people. I would - we shouldn't separate from what's really there, 
you know, being so, you know, technical and picky. You know what I am 
saying? But that-
(Tr., p.57, Ls.11-20.) The district court then informed Mr. Day that he could recommend 
someone to complete an evaluation. (Tr., p.57, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Day then informed the 
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district court that he did not understand what the evaluation was for, demanded that he 
was his own attorney, that he had never been evaluated and that the district court had 
ordered that he be sent to the state hospital because they have a law library not to 
determine competency. (Tr., p.57, L 11 - p.60, L.10.) When pressed on whether or not 
he wanted an evaluation Mr. Day stated he did not need one and that he just wanted to 
go to trial. (Tr., p.60, L.17 - p.61, L.6.) The district court then moved on to discuss the 
dates set for trial and did not revisit the competency issue further. (Tr., p.61, L.7 - p.64, 
L.19.) 
Mr. Day's erratic behavior continued at a hearing the day before trial. At the 
hearing, Mr. Day switched from representing himself to having counsel reappointed 
several times. (Tr., p.75, L.1 - p.114, L.24.) He also continued to submit letters to the 
district court throughout the pendency of his case. (See generally letters included in the 
file, but not numbered as part of the record.) 
Mr. Day's refusal to participate in the prior evaluations should not be considered 
in determining whether a new evaluation should be ordered, nor should his desire to 
have an evaluation completed. It was unknown if Mr. Day was competent or not and 
the district court should not have relied on Mr. Day's wishes as it could not be 
determined whether or not they are the wishes of a person able to meaningfully 
contribute an opinion on the issue. Counsel for Mr. Day represented to the district 
court, although accepting a prior competency finding, that he had serious concerns and 
thought that another evaluation needed to be ordered. Defense counsel often has "the 
best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his defense," Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992). On this basis alone, the district court should have 
ordered an additional evaluation. 
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In addition to counsel's representations to the district court, the district court had 
an opportunity to observe Mr. Day's behavior throughout the time leading up to trial. 
Mr. Day repeatedly demanded to represent himself and then would almost immediately 
request that counsel be appointed. (Tr., p.1, L.1- p.114, L.24.) He wrote numerous 
letters to the district court that were rarely coherent and logical. ( See generally letters 
included in the file, but not numbered as part of the record.) He was frequently unable 
to focus in answering questions and made bizarre statements to the district court. 
(Tr., p.1, L.1- p.114, L.24.) Additionally, the district court was aware that Mr. Day had 
been previously found incompetent and hospitalized for several months. (Tr., p.10, L.1 0 
- p.11, L.12.) Although in 2007, Dr. Wilson determined that Mr. Day was competent 
and that his symptoms were not the result of a treatable mental illness; in the several 
months prior, another doctor, Dr. Sather, determined that Mr. Day was not competent 
and was suffering from a "psychotic disorder" and mild paranoid thinking. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.14-15.) Thus, independent from counsel's 
belief that Mr. Day may not be competent, the court possessed significant evidence 
supporting a finding that Mr. Day was not competent and requiring an additional 
evaluation. 
At the final hearing on competency, the district court failed to evaluate whether 
Mr. Day could assist in his defense or understand the proceedings, but disregarded the 
motion when Mr. Day requested that the case just go to trial. The evidence provided 
supports a conclusion that there was a continuing reason to call into question the 
competency of Mr. Day. The district court failed to act within the bounds of its discretion 
because it failed to evaluate the request utilizing the two prongs of the competency 
standard and untimely made a decision, not through an exercise of reason, but placing 
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all the weight of the decision to order a further evaluation on Mr. Day's final request to 
proceed to trial, ignoring the request of counsel and ample information calling 
competency into question. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion denying 
Mr. Day an additional competency evaluation. 
A 
II. 
The State Violated Mr. Day's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
Introduction 
"[l]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 
'due process."' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o 
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[nlo state 
shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, 
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
lo. CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so 
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's 
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right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 {1982). The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused. Id. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Day's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 {2006). Trial error ordinarily will not 
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. 
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). The issues raised by Mr. Day involve un-
objected to misconduct. 1 Because these claims of error are raised for the first time on 
appeal, Mr. Day must establish that the errors are reviewable as "fundamental error." 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court recently revisited 
fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error: 
{1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning {in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. {footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first 
show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, 
1 Counsel for Mr. Day did object to the misconduct raised on appeal, but for a different 



















I ; t 
or obvious. Id. at 228. ff the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry 
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228. 
C. The State Violated Mr. Day's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the 
trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten 
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1991 )). "Both sides have traditionally 
been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to 
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)). 
However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those 
implied. Id. 
Mr. Day asserts the following statements by the prosecutor constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct which violated Mr. Day's rights to due process and a fair trial: 
Again, it's not the State that's on trial, it's not me that's on trial, it's not 
Detective Barnes that's on trial, it's not Detective Pratt that's on trial. The 
defendant is the one on trial, and the focus is on the evidence that you 
have during the relevant time periods. 
The Jury Instruction Number 6 is going to tell you, "Some of you 
have probably heard the terms 'circumstantial evidence,' 'direct evidence' 
and 'hearsay evidence.' Do not be concerned with these terms. You are 
to consider all the evidence admitted in this trial." You can't concern 
yourself with speculative evidence that Mr. Grant has alluded to. You only 
consider tl1e evidence that is in the trial. 
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Again, we have the defense talking about evidence that we didn't 
bring in. You're not to consider that. There are various Rules of 
Evidence. We're not allowed to bring in hearsay evidence. And interview 
with - testimony about an interview with Tim Hudson would have been 
hearsay evidence. You are not to speculate -
Hearsay evidence is just not something we try to introduce. Again, you're 
only to consider the evidence that has been introduced and not speculate 
on the evidence that might be out there and whether the police failed. 
There are various reasons, and the Rules of Evidence are what bind us at 
to what evidence we can and cannot bring in. 
(Tr., p.628, L.11 - p.629, L.6.) 
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, 
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more 
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the 
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 
Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the 
defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid 
presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain 
from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. 
The above closing argument implies to the jury that there is other evidence of 
Mr. Day's guilt that the State is unable to present because the judicial system is 
prohibiting them from presenting the evidence. This implication flies in the face of the 
jury instructions and even the "do not speculate" standard that the prosecution argues 
should be applied to the defendant. When the State explains that other evidence exists 
(i.e. an interview with Mr. Hudson) it is asking the jury to consider the evidence, even 












prosecution has planted an idea in the minds of the jurors that at a minimum there was 
an interview with Mr. Hudson that they wanted to present, which must have been 
favorable to the State, that they were not allowed to present. The statements also 
suggest that there may be other evidence, like DNA evidence, that the State was not 
allowed to present. 
Further, these statements tell the jury that they should not concern themselves 
with evidence that defense counsel has pointed out would be compelling evidence for 
the State to have presented, but was strangely absent in this case. This is a case, as 
admitted by the State in closing arguments, which is based upon mere circumstantial 
evidence. (Tr., p.599, L.25 - p.602, L.8.) Certainly, a jury can and should consider why 
there is no direct evidence, no eye witness identification, and no physical evidence. 
Why does the eye witness, only minutes after the robbery occurred, state that Mr. Day 
is not the person who robbed him? Why aren't Mr. Day's fingerprints found on the knife 
when others are? Why were none of the apartments in the building examined to see if 
an individual matching the description provided by the victim was hiding inside? These 
are questions relevant to reasonable doubt and should be considered when looking at 
the evidence that was presented to determine guilt. 
The State's suggestion that there is other evidence of guilt that they were not 
allowed to present, while at the same time counseling the jury to not speculate about 
where other evidence that the defense has pointed out is missing, is prosecutorial 
misconduct. The errors in the case relate directly to Mr. Day's unwaived constitutional 
rights. First, it is a violation of Mr. Day's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to 
have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and 
the law as explained in the jury instructions. Id. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in 
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general, directly violates a constitutional right. It should be noted that the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated in Perry that, "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict 
on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence 
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 
150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that 
prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision. 
In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make an 
impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Day's Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury. The State violated Mr. Day's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor 
attempted to encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence 
or lack of evidence presented. 'The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth 
Amendment . . . includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of 
the testimony."' State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) 
(quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting 
State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250~51, 60---P. 403 (1900)). · 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Day's state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to 
a jury trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case 
plainly exists from the record and no additional information is necessary. Further, it 
cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, 











The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction. In the case 
at hand, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Day his right to a fair trial 
because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to 
the verdict. The case was based largely upon circumstantial evidence and the alleged 
victim stated that Mr. Day was not the person that robbed him, that that person was 
smaller. (Tr.8/17/2012, p.22, L.23 - p.24, L.12.) In reviewing the trial as a whole, the 
prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, may have influenced the jury 
in this, a case with little direct evidence. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Day, A Unified 
Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For 
Robbery 
Mr. Day asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of fifteen 








sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w}here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Day does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Day must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 
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141, 145 (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). 
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001)). 
Mr. Day asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating 
factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court failed to give 
proper consideration to his mental health issues. Idaho courts have previously 
recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's 
mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). 
Mr. Day has been previously diagnosed with ADD as a teenager. (PSI, p.14.) In 2006, 
Mr. Day was transferred to the State Hospital for counseling and treatment necessary 
for Mr. Day to be able to assist in his defense. (PSI, p.14.) About two months later, 
Dr. Sather noted that Mr. Day had been experiencing a "psychotic disorder" and mild 
paranoid thinking. (PS~, p.14.) He also stated that Mr. Day's speech was disorganized 
and that his responses were "vague, guarded, and ambivalent." (PSI, p.15.) At that 
time, Dr. Sather did not believe Mr. Day was competent to proceed. (PSI, p.15.) 
However, about a month later, Dr. Wilson stated that he did not believe Mr. Day's 
symptoms were the result of a treatable mental illness and that his paranoia was a 
manifestation of his characterological problems. (PSI, p.15.) 
Although Mr. Day primarily refused to participate in a current mental health 






















and "hearing tongues." (PSI, p.14.) Further, as discussed in section I, Mr. Day had 
been exhibiting some signs of mental illness throughout the pendency of his case. 
Additionally, Mr. Day asserts the district court did not give proper weight to 
Mr. Day's admitted substance abuse problem and desire to stop using. Idaho courts 
have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be 
considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct App. 1991). 
Mr. Day first used illicit drugs at the age of twelve. (PSI, p.16.) He first used 
alcohol at the age of fifteen. (PSI, p.16.) He has admitted to using marijuana, 
hydrocodone, alcohol, and methamphetamine. (PSI, p.16.) Although Mr. Day refused 
to participate in the current court ordered substance abuse evaluation, in 2007, he 
noted that he had a desire to discontinue his substance abuse. (PSI, p.16.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Day asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his mental health issues and substance abuse 




Mr. Day respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand the 
case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 201 
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